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Richard Connolly 
 






This paper explains political developments across the post-communist region 
from a fresh perspective. Broadly speaking, the focus is on the relationship between 
the structure of a country’s economic system and the types of social order that have 
developed across the post-communist region. More specifically, attention is focused 
on how different patterns of reintegration with the international economy, primarily 
through the role of export sectors, have shaped the development of different types of 
social order. Thus, unlike many existing studies in comparative political economy, the 
explanatory framework emphasizes not the role of the state in shaping the economy 
(see, for example, Amsden, 1985, 1989; Evans, 1995, Wade, 2004), but instead on 
how economic variables shape politics (see, for example, Shafer, 1994; Karl, 1997). 
The focus on politics is, however, in some ways both broader and narrower than 
existing research.  
 
Although progress or otherwise in developing democratic institutions is the subject 
of a large body of existing research, the focus here is not on explaining variation 
across the region in many of the formal, procedural indicators of democracy. Instead, 
the dependent variable – type of social order – is more narrowly defined to 
encompass the extent to which competition within societies (social, economic, 
political, and so on) is resolved according to impersonal, universally applied rules. In 
this sense, issues of accountability, the rule of law, and the prevalence of corruption 
are emphasized more directly than the procedural aspects of democracy (e.g. 
elections, political party behaviour). However, these variables do act as a measure of 
the health of democracy in societies where many of the formal institutions of 
democracy may have already been adopted but only in a manner that is inconsistent 
with the substantive meaning of democracy (e.g. Wilson, 2005). Thus, while the focus 
is not on democracy per se, it is on those very factors that determine whether or not 
the informal practices of a society are consistent with the formal, procedural   3
institutions. As such, any conclusions drawn on the relationship between economic 
structure and the dependent variable, as defined in this dissertation, are likely to 
have wider implications.      
 
However, in other ways the conceptual focus is also broader than that of some of 
the existing research on the processes of state formation across the post-communist 
region (see, for example, Gryzmala-Busse, 2006; O’Dwyer, 2006; Ganev, 2007). 
Although these studies also explore the impact of competition on political outcomes, 
their attention is directed towards explaining patterns of state exploitation or party 
patronage. In this sense, the subject of this dissertation is broader as any variation in 
type of social order has much wider implications than simply for patterns of state 
exploitation, or relations between political parties and the state. While the type of 
social order prevailing in any given society will surely help explain why some states 
are subjected to more predation than others, it also has implications for myriad 
spheres of life in any society. Furthermore, where these studies identify political 
competition as the key to restraining ‘rent-seeking’ across the post-communist region, 
the sources of this political competition remain ambiguous. This paper proposes an 
analytical framework that might sharpen our understanding of why some societies 
exhibit greater levels of competition (economic, political, and more) than others.    
 
The paper is organized in the following way. The first section outlines the basic 
conceptual framework, emphasizing the symbiotic relationship between economics 
and politics. Social orders are defined and are shown to differ in the degree to which 
competition is prevalent, and the extent to which this competition is resolved 
according to impersonal, universally enforced rules. The second section proposes an 
explanation for the variation in how competition is channeled across the post-
communist region. It is suggested that different patterns of integration with the 
international economy, as manifested in the structure of a country’s export profile, 
can help increase our understanding of the sources of social order across the region. 




   4
2. The object of explanation: social orders across the post-communist region 
 
The symbiotic relationship between economy and polity is captured by the 
concept of limited-access (LAO) and open-access (OAO) social orders (North, Wallis 
and Weingast, 2006, 2007). These constitute two broadly defined poles of a social 
order dichotomy that emphasize the ‘double-balance’ between political and economic 
systems, highlighting the complex interplay between organizations and institutions in 
both the political and economic sphere. Social orders encompass the wide array of 
political, economic, cultural, religious, military, and educational systems that might be 
present within a society. The form of social order shapes the organizational pattern of 
its constituent systems. The types of organizational patterns that can exist within a 
social order can vary widely. However, the key manner in which social orders differ is 
in their ability to create and maintain contractual organizations, and can therefore be 
distinguished by the nature of competition between organizations and the manner in 
which rents are created.
1 In open access systems, open competition ensures that an 
impersonal form of contractual organization is prevalent, while in limited access 
systems contractual organizations are more informal and arbitrary. The ‘double-
balance’ described above refers to the manner in which the distribution of economic 
rents and political power are related; LAOs see the distribution of rents intertwined 
with political power, while OAOs exhibit a more even distribution of economic rents 
and political power.
2      
 
Although all societies contain competitive tendencies, it is the manner in which 
societies channel competition that distinguishes a social order, with LAOs resolving 
                                                 
1  Organizations can be broken down into two main types of  organization: ‘adherent organizations’ and 
‘contractual organizations’ (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2006, pp.21-33). Adherent  organizations are 
characterized by self enforcing, incentive-compatible agreements among their members and are not reliant on 
third parties to enforce agreements among members. Cooperation requires that it must be in the interests of all of 
the members to remain in the organization, or ultimately those individuals will cease to cooperate. Contractual 
organizations, on the other hand, utilize third party enforcement of contracts among their members. Contractual 
organizations may also rely on incentive-compatible agreements among members in contractual organizations, 
but they employ third party enforcement for some arrangements so that members can pre-commit to a subset of 
arrangements among themselves that may not, at all times, otherwise be incentive-compatible.  
2 Other theoretical and empirical discussions of the relationship between political and economic competition 
include: Schumpeter, J. (1948), Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Chicago: Chicago University Press; 
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999), Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; Rustow, D. (1970), Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” 
Comparative Politics, Vol.2, No.3, pp.337-63; Migdal, J. (1988), Strong Societies and Weak States: State-
Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton: Princeton University Press; Demsetz, H. 
(1982),  Economic, Legal and Political Dimensions of Competition, Amsterdam: North-Holland; Stigler, G. 
(1972), “Economic Competition and Political Competition,” Public Choice, Vol.13, pp.91-106.    5
competitive tendencies among organizations in a more arbitrary and sometimes 
violent manner than in OAOs. Similarly, rents are created in different ways within the 
two social orders.
3 Whereas in perfectly competitive open access markets, 
competition for rents among organizations leads infra-marginal rents to accrue to 
many producers and consumers, in LAOs organizations limit market entry and 
competition to ensure that individuals or organizations (whether it be the state or 
firms) with market power can accrue rents. Rents can also be created by differential 
access to organizational forms or resources if, for example, a firm in an industry is 
able to ensure the special enforcement of its contracts, then even in a competitive 
market that firm earns infra-marginal rents because of lower costs. On a wider scale, 
the purposeful creation of rents by states in LAOs is a consequence of the purposeful 
creation of differential access for individuals or organizations to the goods and 
services that the state can provide, such as enforcement of property rights and 
contracts, legal systems, etc. Consequently, it is the extent to which social orders are 
governed by rules and legal frameworks that distinguishes whether it is a limited or 
open access order and it is this that constitutes the object of explanation throughout 
this dissertation.  
 
2.1. Limited-access orders (LAOs) 
 
In limited access orders – as in open access orders - politics and economics 
are mutually constitutive. Actors within the state limit economic entry to other actors 
within society to generate economic rents which are used to create credible 
commitments among competing elites to support the current regime and provide 
some sense of order within society (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2006, 2007; 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, 2008).
4 Because the political system is used to 
manipulate the economic system to produce and maintain order, it is possible to 
conceive of economic and political systems as existing separately, but not as 
independent entities. Thus, the political system is not exogenous to the economic 
                                                 
3 Rents can be defined as ‘profits in excess of the competitive level’. See: Brealy, R.A. and S.C. Myers (2000), 
Principles of Corporate Finance, New York: McGraw-Hill. Rents, like competiton, are ubiquitous. They accrue 
to the individuals or organizations that own or control an economic asset, when the benefit received by that asset 
for performing any action exceed the opportunity cost of performing the action. However, establishing what 
level of profit is competitive is entirely subjective. Because of the similarity between profit and rent the choice of 
using the latter over the former is, in effect, down to the discretion of the user.  
4 Such elites can be labeled ‘distributional coalitions’, see Olson, M. (1982), The Rise and Decline of Nations, 
Yale, NJ: Yale University Press.   6
system due to the political system being the primary actor in the economy. Similarly, 
the economic system is not exogenous to the political system, since the existence of 
economic rents structure political relationships.
5  
 
LAOs are relatively conservative orders in which only limited economic and 
political change occurs. This is because although LAOs possess some inherent 
incentives to promote specialization and division of labour – through the provision of 
rents to powerful elites – they only extend to the point where elites will be required to 
increase the degree of entry, openness and access to the economic system. This 
would then reduce the rents that had previously accrued to the elite in question and 
increase the threat to the prevailing status-quo (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). The 
potential development of an LAO therefore involves a tradeoff in which “the gains 
from specialization must be balanced against the threat of disorder” (North, Wallis 
and Weingast, 2006, p.16; see also, Acemoglu, 2008). Although there are differences 
in the internal structure of LAOs, they all share in common a propensity among their 
ruling elites to limit economic, political, and social access to generate economic rents 
and then use the rents to create credible commitments between elites to the existing 
social order.  
 
In comparison with the OAOs, typical LAOs today have state-controlled 
industries, problematic business licensing regimes (for new entrants), and patron-
client networks characterized by high levels of corruption. “All are manifestations of 
rent-creation” (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2006, p.11). LAOs often share many 
formal institutional structures with OAOs – including, elections, legal frameworks, 
corporations, etc. - but the extent to which the informal beliefs, conventions and 
patterns of behaviour ‘fit’ with the formal rules is very different to that observed in 
OAOs. More sophisticated LAOs possess robust institutional structures for the state 
and can enable a wide array of elite organizations to exist separate from the state. In 
practice, this means that the institutions of the state must be readily identifiable by 
members of the dominant coalition. A sophisticated LAO, therefore, “has a well 
articulated body of public law that specifies the offices and functions of the state, the 
                                                 
5 The forms of state autonomy in LAOs can be either absolute, in which case rents accrue directly to a predatory 
state rather to private organizations, or compromised, in which case the state is itself the subject of predation by 
private organizations. The distinction between predatory and predated states is made in Evans, P. (1995) 
Embedded Autonomy: States and Economic Transformation, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.    7
relationship between the offices and functions, and provides for methods of resolving 
conflicts within the state, and by extension, within the dominant coalition” (North, 
Wallis and Weingast, 2006, p.14).
6 
 
2.2. Open access orders (OAOs) 
 
In contrast to LAOs, open access orders are sustained by competition rather 
than rent creation. Specifically, political competition is necessary to maintain open 
access in the economy, and economic competition is necessary to maintain open 
access in the polity. Open access orders are sustainable when a society is able to 
produce three outcomes: (i) entry into economic, political, religious, and educational 
activities is open to all citizens without restraint; (ii) support for organizational forms in 
each of those activities that are open to all citizens; and (iii) the rule of law enforced 
impartially for all citizens. Schumpeterian creative destruction ensues when entry into 
economic activities is open to all citizens and organizations. With open access 
market entry, economic actors create rents through innovation. Competition then 
gradually erodes those rents as new firms and individuals enter either new markets 
or by transforming existing markets. Although economic organizations might prefer to 
shape the political process to restrict entry and maintain access to rents and, 
although political actors might prefer to use the political process to restrict entry, 
create rents, and bind economic actors to support a developing political coalition, 
what prevents elites from transforming open access orders into LAOs is the fact that 
the persistent competition that is a consequence of open entry frustrates the wishes 
of economic and political actors to create permanent rents through limiting access to 
markets.
7 This reduction of rents through open competition is the defining 
characteristic of open-access orders.  
                                                 
6 It should be noted that in order to facilitate the emergence of more sophisticated LAOs, increasingly 
independent and sophisticated elite organizations are not only a source of socio-economic development, but their 
existence stimulates the emergence of more sophisticated institutions and organizations within the state. This is 
due to the manner in which non-state organizations fight to protect the differentiation and autonomy of public 
institutions, such as courts and the central bank.  This process is more visible in OAOs, where sophisticated 
private organizations in a market economy serve as a counterbalance to political organizations. In sophisticated 
LAOs, the government can credibly commit to a wider range of policies and institutions because elite private 
organizations can effectively punish the government if it deviates from its commitments. In this way, a double 
balance between the sophistication of public and private organizations emerges in mature LAOs that can sustain 
a considerable level of political and economic development. 
7 Studies that examine the role of competition in reducing rent-seeking behaviour include: Demsetz, H. (1982), 
Economic, Legal and Political Dimensions of Competition, Amsterdam: North-Holland; and Stigler, G. (1972), 
“Economic Competition and Political Competition,” Public Choice, Vol.13, pp.91-106.    8
 
The creation of privileges for one person or organization that is the defining 
characteristic of LAOs necessarily involves the denial of opportunities and access to 
other individuals or organizations. However, because all actors within an open 
access order wield the ability to form organizations, the selective distribution of rents 
by the state is likely to stimulate opposition by other well organized groups. If access 
to organizational forms is open, the state cannot prevent groups forming to oppose 
the state’s action. Indeed, in open access orders one organization cannot prevent the 
formation of another organization with conflicting goals. This is the essence of 
relative state autonomy: no organization, whether it be the state itself or a private 
organization is able to prevent the entry of other organizations in order to maintain 
access to rents. This is because competition between organizations limits the 
exploitation of the state by raising the costs for ruling elites and lowering the benefits. 
In contrast, LAOs support the selective creation of elite organizations with similar 
interests to those of the dominant coalition. An LAO exercises greater influence over 
the distribution of interests within both the elite and wider society through the 
systematic manipulation of rents. This is because state autonomy is either absolute 
or compromised in LAOs whereas the autonomy of the state is relative, or 
‘embedded’, within OAOs (Evans, 1995).
8  
 
Any attempt to create rents by the political actors may stimulate other 
economic organizations that are adversely affected by rent creation to organize 
politically. Because organizations mobilize and coordinate their members when their 
interests are threatened, open access to organizations of all types, especially 
economic, helps sustain political competition. Indeed, political competition in the 
context of open access to organizations also provides opposition political parties with 
both the formal incentive and legal right to monitor the state and oppose 
developments that may potentially compromise competition and the integrity of an 
open-access system in general. Open access to organizational forms is therefore 
critical to both political and economic activities. While competition and its beneficial 
                                                 
8 Relative state autonomy, or ‘embedded’ autonomy, refers to a situation where the state is immersed in a dense 
network of ties that binds it to groups or classes that can become allies in the pursuit of socially negotiated goals. 
Thus, they are neither fully insulated from social groups, as is the case of absolute autonomy, nor are they 
subject to predation by a few powerful groups. This is because the density of the state’s links to different 
segments of society ensures that no group enjoys disproportionate access to the state. This concept is outlined in 
more detail in Evans (1995).    9
effects upon the development of a social order are clearly of immense importance, it 
is not clear what causes some societies to become more competitive – within the 
economy and at the political level - than others.   
 
2.3. The ‘double balance’ between politics and economics 
 
The concept of the ‘double-balance’ suggests that open access political and 
economic systems cannot sustain themselves independently of the other system.
9 A 
competitive political system cannot be sustained by its own internal structure and 
institutions if it is located within a limited access economy. For example, open access 
for economic organizations sustains a wide range of organizations that could 
potentially mobilize against a ruling coalition that seeks to limit access to the 
economy and create rents for its favoured organizations. Indeed, if political 
competition is to be maintained over a longer period of time, the shifting distribution 
of economic resources that exists in an open access economy should discipline 
political actors. Conversely, the distribution of economic resources does not shift as 
frequently or with the same degree of freedom in an LAO, because the of the manner 
in which  logic of the LAO controls the pattern of economic interests, which is then 
reflected in a less frequent shift in the distribution of resources among political 
organizations. Thus, the nature of the principal sources of economic power within a 
society is likely to have important implications for the types of political institutions that 
are likely to emerge (Karl 1997, p.44-5). Existing research on patterns of state 
formation supports this by asserting the importance of the nature of economic 
resources in shaping the extraction strategies (i.e. taxation) that elites pursue to 
impose different patterns of governance (Tilly, 1992; Herbst, 2000).
10 
 
In contrast to LAOs, all open-access orders have sophisticated public and 
private organizations as open entry in both economy and polity stimulates the 
creation of more sophisticated groups and generates forces that provide balance in 
                                                 
9 This is where the exogeneity assumptions of many orthodox approaches to economics and political science 
suffer severe weaknesses. Any approach that seeks to explain either needs to take into account the other. 
Consequently, ‘political economy’ like that employed by Adam Smith and David Ricardo, in which poltics and 
economics are seen as mutually constitutive, is a more appropriate approach. 
10 The sociological literature on the the emergence of state institutions sees leaders demanding greater resources 
from their subjects in order to increase their war fighting capacity. In return for greater resources, primarily 
taxes, leaders are forced into making concessions, such as political representation for taxed elites, as a quid pro 
quo. Which sections of society provide tax receipts and are granted political representation then shapes the types 
of state structures that are formed.    10
both systems. As with the limited-access order, the logic of open-access describes a 
self-sustaining social order where all of the constituent parts are involved in a 
complex interrelationship that  maintains the prevailing social order. Indeed, political 
competition in an open access order demands the existence of many large, 
sophisticated, well organized organizations that can effectively compete with one 
another through whatever political institutions exist. On its part, to sustain open entry, 
the state in an open-access order must have significant specialized institutions both 
that provide these services and that make the necessary credible commitments to 
maintain them without expropriating the value they create. It is imperative that the 
state possess the capacity to create incentive compatible institutions so that both 
those in power and their constituents have an incentive to abide by the rules of the 
game, whether they be formal or informal rules.  
 
Central to the limited-open access order dichotomy is the emphasis on the 
importance of both formal (de jure) and informal (de facto) rules (see, for example, 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). The adoption of, for example, formally open access 
institutions in a society – such as a legal framework that guarantees private property 
rights, or a constitution that guarantees citizenship rights – requires a corresponding 
adoption of informal practices and conventions that mirror these formal rules. Without 
this, the formal rules will remain hollow with an increased probability of them being 
rejected at a later point in favour of formal rules that reflect informal rules and 
conventions. It is the mutually constitutive relationship between institutions and 
organizations within that gives substance to formal rules. Without open access to all 
organizational forms in both polity and economy, the maintenance of open access in 
the political arena is not possible in the long run. Thus, in both limited- and open-
access social orders there are a range of economic, political, religious, military, and 
educational organizations that reinforce one another, with the mutually supporting 
logic of each respective order ensuring that any formal institutions will, over time, 
broadly reflect the interests and beliefs of the constituent parts of a given society.  
 
As noted in the preceding discussion of institutional change, change and 
continuity are both possible within institutional structures. In limited access orders, 
elites are impelled to balance the distribution of elite interests within the dominant 
coalition. A shift in the incentives facing a major actor to defect from the coalition and   11
use violence or other means to forward his interests will produce instability, if not 
open conflict. Because many shocks – including technological advances, changes in 
relative prices, international pressures – may affect the relative distribution of elite 
resources and organizational capacity the internal structure of the dominant coalition 
and its distribution of rents are not immune to change. Any shock that changes the 
distribution of resources across the elite can force the renegotiation of the distribution 
of rents; and a violent resolution to conflict may be a constant possibility, because 
members of the dominant coalition may fail to reach a negotiated redistribution. 
Consequently, it is possible to argue that although LAOs are relatively stable as a 
social order, they are certainly not static. Although frequent changes in the 
composition of the dominant coalition and the distribution of rents may occur, they 
remain limited access orders. 
 
2.4. Social orders in the post-communist context  
 
The overview of limited-access and open-access orders given above should 
focus attention on the types of challenges that have confronted and continue to face 
societies across the post-communist region. Communist societies were, without 
exception, limited-access orders, although there was some significant variation in the 
internal organization of the different states.
11 Unlike most contemporary examples of 
limited-access orders across the world, the economy was to all intents and purposes 
dominated by the party-state with almost all independent private economic 
organizations suppressed.
12 In this respect, the autonomy of communist states was 
absolute, with the state performing a predatory role within the economy and rents 
accrued to the party-state, which itself acted as a sort of ‘ruling class’ (see, for 
example, Cliff, 1974). The absence of any significant independent economic 
organizations was mirrored by the political domination of each ruling communist party 
and meant that competition on all levels was extremely limited and, when present, 
was largely confined to internal competition within the ruling party.  
 
                                                 
11 See the typologies contained within Kitschelt, H, Z. Mansfeldova, R. Markowski, and G. Zobor (1999), Post-
communist party systems. Competition, representation, and inter-party cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press); and Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996) op cit.  
12 Some significant private economic activity was tolerated to varying degrees in Yugoslavia, Hungary and 
Poland, but still the genereal tendency was towards state ownership. However, within the Soviet Union the only 
private economic activity that was officially sanctioned was, until the mid-1980s, largely confined to small-scale 
(i.e. allotment level) agricultural production.      12
With the collapse of the ruling communist parties that started in 1989 in 
Eastern Europe, and culminated in 1991 with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
most ruling elites across the region expressed – at least at a formal level - a desire to 
transform their respective countries from limited-access orders to more open-access 
orders, usually citing the formation of democratic political systems and free market 
economies as the desired outcome. Indeed, most countries across the region initially 
did just that and adopted many of the formal features of open-access systems, 
including measures to liberalize their economies and to democratize their political 
systems. However, as time has passed, it has become apparent that there remains a 
great deal of variation across the region in the degree to which these formal 
institutions have been given more substantive meaning by a change in informal 
practices. Furthermore, the ‘double balance’ described above has often thwarted 
attempts to install democratic practices in countries that have not managed to create 
open-access economies, thus inhibiting the development of open-access political 
systems. The framework explicated above suggests that the sources of this variation 
lie in the degree of competition present within a society, with higher levels of 
competition providing the demand for greater emphasis on rule-based institutional 
practices.     
 
This relationship between political competition and institutional outcomes 
across the post-communist region has been the subject of increasing attention 
(Grzymala-Busse and Jones-Luong, 2002; Grzymala-Busse, 2002, 2006; O’Dwyer, 
2004, 2006; Ganev, 2005, 2007; Sikk, 2006; Haughton, 2008). Although much of the 
research so far has focused on patterns of state-building or ‘state-stealing’, central to 
all of these explanations is an appreciation of the importance of robust political 
competition in reducing the opportunities for rent-seeking opportunities among post-
communist elites. Where competition is less intense there appears to be a tendency 
towards greater exploitation of the state for private benefits. The focus in this paper is 
somewhat broader than on the patterns of state exploitation or patronage politics that 
are the object of explanation elsewhere. Here, the emphasis is on whether social 
orders within post-communist societies are defined by more or less regard for formal 
rules and encompasses not just relations between political parties and the state, but 
also among business, trade unions, civil society and any other sections of society 
whose behaviour might be regulated by state-sanctioned legal frameworks. Indeed,   13
while the focus on patterns of patronage in political parties is relevant in 
parliamentary democracies, it can be of less importance in presidential systems 
where the relationship between business and the presidential administration might be 
of more importance. Furthermore, defining state exploitation in terms of the changes 
in the size of state administrations can be problematic as these may not necessarily 
be a function of party patronage, but instead of broader public sector reform or 
reorganization (Meyer-Sahling, 2006; Haughton, 2008).   
 
However, the conclusions derived from the studies cited above do suggest that 
the sources of lower levels of state exploitation are to be found in the levels of 
political competition. This is consistent with the hypothesis that higher levels of 
competition lead to societies resolving the competitive tendencies present within 
them through open, rule-based frameworks. If robust political competition is integral 
to ensuring lower levels of rent-seeking among elites and to compelling elites to play 
by the rules, perhaps the most obvious challenge would therefore be to locate the 
sources of robust political competition. The next section of this paper proposes one 
factor that might be of explanatory importance: namely, that the sources of political 
competition are to be found in the structure of a society’s economy, and, in turn, that 
economy’s place in the wider global economy. This is consistent with the concept of 
the ‘double balance’ outlined above and offers a parsimonious explanation of how the 
structural features of a society’s political economy can explain the variation in forms 
of social order across the post-communist region.       
 
3.The explanatory variable: Economic structure and the international economy 
 
The ‘double balance’ between economy and polity outlined above suggests that 
political systems will tend to reflect the prevailing economic system within a society, 
and that changes in one are necessary for changes in the other. In turn, this has 
implications for the wider form of social order; if a social order is to be characterized 
as open-access then the economic system must provide the conditions that facilitate 
greater political competition. The focus of this dissertation will therefore be on tracing 
what economic conditions facilitate increased levels of political competition. 
Principally, it will be argued that the nature of a country’s ties with the international 
economy, and the level of competition within a country’s economic system, will shape   14
the nature of political competition within that society. After several decades of relative 
‘bloc autarky’, this ongoing process of reintegration within the post-communist region 
has resulted in varying patterns of interaction with the international economy, 
manifesting itself in the form of distinct export structures. These export structures will 
be measured across three indices. First, the degree of inter-sectoral concentration or 
diversity will be measured. Second, the technology intensity of these sectors will be 
measured. Finally, the market structure of leading export sectors will also be 
considered, i.e. whether a leading sector exhibits monopolistic, oligopolistic or 
competitive tendencies. Export structures that are characterized by inter-sectoral 
diversity, medium to high levels of technology intensity within the leading export 
sectors, and higher levels of intra-sectoral competition will be expected to facilitate 
more robust political competition.     
 
The next section describes the mechanisms through which increasing 
participation in the world economy can shape domestic economic and political 
organizations. It will be shown that changes in the levels of trade and in relative 
prices between factors of production and economic sectors can affect the relative 
distribution of resources among organizations within a society. This is followed by an 
overview of how specific sectors might be expected to interact with the state. It is 
argued that a country’s export structure (the inter- and intra-sectoral distribution of 
production as well as the technology intensity of these sectors) is an important factor 
in molding the behaviour of economic organizations vis-à-vis the state. These factors 
will be shown to affect the distribution of resources among domestic organizations 
with particular implications for the autonomy of the state. In turn, it will be argued that 
certain patterns of state autonomy will result in specific types of social order. This 
explanation of institutional development places issues of institutional continuity and 
change at the centre of analysis. For example, an awareness of the influence of the 
international economy and of the role of technological change introduces exogenous 
variables that are often key to explaining institutional change.  Similarly, an emphasis 
on the effects of economic sectors and their constituent organizations on state 
autonomy can also shed light on why some societies are more resistant to change – 
both economic and political - than others. For instance, the presence of powerful 
economic organizations with an interest in resisting change may explain the 
prevalence of continuity rather than change in certain cases.     15
 
3.1. The international economy and domestic economic organizations 
 
There are a number of ways in which increasing integration with the 
international economy can affect the preferences and resources of actors and 
organizations within countries. Firstly, increased integration can expand the tradables 
sector within an economy, thus exposing an increasing amount of economic activity 
within a country to the fluctuations of world markets. Therefore, ceteris paribus, 
increased interaction with the world economy should increase the sensitivity of 
national economies to developments in world markets. As will be discussed later, this 
can affect the strategies that some organizations employ against the state in order to 
insulate themselves from fluctuations in international markets. Furthermore, 
increased interaction with the world economy affects the relative prices of goods or 
assets owned by organizations within the economy, compared to both each other 
and also to foreign goods and organizations. These changes in relative prices have 
important implications for growth, and more importantly in the context of this study, 
for the distribution of income and resources across the economy. Consequently, 
organizations that benefit from these changes may pressure the state to maintain or 
increase levels of interaction with the world economy, or organizations that are 
disadvantaged may resist integration by pressuring the state for protection or 
restrictions to trade. Either way, changes within the international economy result in 
fluctuations in the relative power of domestic economic and political organizations. 
 
The likelihood of organizations achieving their aims is contingent on both the 
resources at their disposal and on their relationships with the state. This is because 
increased integration with the world economy affects organizations and their capacity 
to organize in different ways, depending on the institutional context and the relative 
power of organizations prevailing in each case. For instance, limited-access orders 
will already be characterized by compromised state autonomy with some selected 
organizations enjoying the benefits of rent creation. In these instances, the likelihood 
of increased integration with the world economy affecting the relative distribution of 
domestic resources will be somewhat reduced due to the expectation that the 
institutional structures mediating the effects of increased integration will insulate elite 
organizations from at least some of the effects of relative price changes. Thus, the   16
mediating role of domestic institutions is central to explaining how the effects of 
increased interaction with the world economy can be absorbed, blocked or refracted, 
depending on the institutional context that conditions the incentives facing 
organizations within a country.  
 
There are four arguments within the existing body of literature that identify the 
likely effects of increasing interaction with the world economy on domestic politics 
and economics (Milner and Keohane, 1996). The first, associated with Ronald 
Rogowski’s (1989) Commerce and Coalitions, argues that changes in international 
trade flows affects domestic political alignments by altering the returns to factors of 
production. Rooting his analysis in the Heckscher-Ohlin approach to international 
trade, Rogowski argues that organizations characterized by factors that gain or lose 
from changes in international markets form distinct political coalitions that tend to 
mark the major political cleavages within countries, with winners pressuring the state 
for the maintenance of links with the international economy and losers pressuring the 
state to slow or reverse patterns of integration.  
 
This argument can be developed by suggesting that coalitions formed along 
factors is too broad an approach, and that the factors of production used are in fact 
tied to specific sectors within the economy, thus suggesting that coalitions will form 
along cleavages defined by economic sector  rather than factors of production per se. 
Consequently, political conflicts will not crystallize along labour versus capital lines, 
or landowners versus industrialists, but instead between tradable or non-tradable 
sectors or between primary product exporters and domestic producers or consumer 
goods. This view is exemplified by Peter Gourevitch (1986) who argues that 
countries’ production profiles, defined by “the preferences of societal actors as 
shaped by the actors’ situation in the international and domestic economy”, can help 
explain why countries adopt certain trade policies. Indeed, the implications are 
broader for changes in trade flows and volumes and the competitiveness of sectors 
mould the preferences of sectorally defined organizations as well as the relative 
distribution of resources among sectors.  
 
The third argument that stresses the effects of increasing integration with the 
global economy focuses attention at an even more specific level than sectors. In   17
Resisting  Protectionism, Helen Milner (1988) argues that the sheer complexity of 
modern economies means that the gains or losses from trade are felt among even 
more specific groups of organizations than broadly defined factors of production or 
sectors. Instead, the gains and losses from trade accrue to particular firms with 
domestic political and economic coalitions formed between firms that share the same 
interests. Milner illustrates this point by pointing to the manner in which the differing 
extent of export dependence or multinationalization of production by firms shape the 
preferences of organizations towards the regulation of trade.  
 
Finally, the manner in which different levels of integration into the world 
economy may shape the character of institutional structures themselves is 
considered, rather than on organizations as in the studies described above. This can 
be seen as a natural extension of the conflict between organizations over the gains 
and losses from trade and the effect that this has on the relative distribution of 
resources. As groups negotiate the terms on which trade may be permissible, 
compromises may be forged between winners and losers to ensure that a ‘zero-sum’ 
outcome does not ensue. For instance, David Cameron (1978) demonstrates how the 
increasing exposure to the international economy among developed countries in the 
1960s and 1970s led to an increase in the size of public sectors as winners from 
trade sought to reduce the impact on losers from trade. Elsewhere, Peter Katzenstein 
(1985) in Small States in World Markets argues that the corporatist structures of 
some small European states were purposefully designed to provide an institutional 
mechanism that might mobilize support among the populations to cope with the costs 
of rapidly increasing levels of interaction with the world economy.    
 
All of the above studies illustrate the importance of the role of increasing levels 
of interaction between domestic economies and the international economy, thereby 
highlighting the Janus-faced nature of states’ positions in the world economy and the 
implications that this has for domestic politics (Skocpol, 1979). Following Gourevitch, 
this paper focuses on the role of economic sectors, specifically export sectors, in 
shaping institutional development across the post-communist region. The impact of 
changes in the world economy on sectors’ distribution of resources and the strategies 
employed by sectors to achieve their aims are considered to be of central 
importance. The sectoral attributes of economic organizations and the market   18
structures of prominent sectors are seen as integral to explaining what levels of 
competition or rent-seeking are present within an economic system which, it is 
argued, has important implications for the development of robust political competition 
within a society and the type of social order that is likely to emerge. 
  
3.2. How export sectors shape politics   
 
The importance of a country’s ties with the international economy suggests 
that the structure of a country’s export profile, and the distribution of power and 
resources among domestic organizations that is a function of this structure, is a 
significant factor in shaping the developing of different types of social order. 
Principally, it is will be argued that the development of patterns of social orders within 
societies is, to some degree, a product of the characteristics of the dominant export 
sectors within an economy. Particular sectoral attributes result in distinct market 
structures (both domestically and internationally) that endow organizations with 
varying levels of power and shape their preferences, each of which reward different 
kinds of organizations and demand particular strategies. By shaping the degree of 
competition or rent creation within an economy, these sectoral attributes influence the 
nature of competition within a society and result in distinct patterns of institutional 
development, and of interest groups with sectorally determined interests and 
collective action capabilities. These sectorally framed organizations and interests 
interact to produce different patterns of social order. In short, a sectoral approach to 
institutional analysis explains how different sectoral profiles affect the nature of 
economic and political competition within a society. 
 
The relationship between economic structure and politics has been 
investigated elsewhere. Earlier analyses (Wittfogel, 1957) link different agrarian 
modes of production to the development of specific social formations, and argue that 
class coalitions and the way agriculture was organized determined which political 
institutions emerged in the early modern period and afterwards (Moore, 1966). This 
line of argument was extended to more recent examples in Latin America, where 
economic structure is identified as the primary source of variation in behaviour across 
agrarian social movements (Paige, 1975), with it being argued that the interests and 
capacity for collective action of agrarian economic organizations are determined by   19
the sectoral organization of the export crop that they are producing. In a later study, 
Paige (1991) developed this theory from one that dealt only with agrarian societies to 
one that examines the role of a wider array of economic organizations, suggesting 
that the policy variation among Latin American countries to similar external 
challenges were a result of “choices made by social groups [whose] economic 
interests…are central to their political choices”, and that economic interests are the 
primary factor in affecting the evolution of national politics (Paige, 1991, pp.7-8). For 
Paige, the level of pressure exerted by economic interest groups would be in direct 
proportion to the amount that such groups had to gain or lose from policy and to the 
amount of resources that could be mobilized to advance their cause.   
 
In more recent studies, Terry Lynn Karl’s (1997) analysis of ‘petro-states’ also 
illustrates how the dominance of certain economic sectors can result in particular 
political and economic outcomes. Karl argues that oil resources shape the structure 
of state and non-state organizations and interests which lead to political regimes 
defined by deeply entrenched patterns of rent-seeking. This has since been 
supported by further research exploring the link high natural resource endowments 
and dysfunctional political development. Elsewhere, Michael Shafer (1994) indentifies 
the ways in which the dominant export sectors tie a country to the international 
economy and how the characteristics of these leading sectors then affect the 
development of domestic state autonomy and capacity. He argues that when a 
state’s production and export profile is highly concentrated in one sector, the 
characteristics of the leading sector play a crucial role in molding political institutions. 
If the leading sector is dominated by a small number of organizations, with high 
barriers to entry and exit, and a high degree of asset specificity, it is likely to be 
exceptionally politically influential. In such a context, state autonomy is eroded as the 
dominant sector imposes its preferences upon the state. Such states then become 
dependent on the leading sector and develop specialized institutional capabilities that 
deal with the dominant sector to the detriment of the requirements of other economic 
sectors.   
 
3.3. Sectoral attributes and the implications for economic and political competition.  
   20
In order to gauge the attributes of a particular sector a sectoral approach 
begins by measuring four variables: (i) capital intensity; (ii) the extent of economies of 
scale; (iii) production flexibility; and (iv) asset/factor flexibility/specificity (Shafer, 
1994, pp.22-25). As will be discussed below, these variables are broadly related to 
the level of technological development within a sector. On the surface, capital 
intensity simply refers to the amount of capital available per unit of labour. However, 
the term indirectly refers to a lot more, including start-up costs, production costs, and 
research and development costs. These serve as a proxy for other characteristics of 
a particular sector, such as technical complexity, management professionalism and 
the skill level of the work force. Similarly, whilst economies of scale describes the 
extent to which the production costs of a good decline with the number of goods 
produced, it also acts as a proxy for the geographical concentration of production, the 
size and composition of the workforce, and the extent to which specific infrastructure 
is required. Production flexibility is the ability to meet short-term market shifts by 
varying output levels or product mix. Finally, asset/factor flexibility/specificity refers to 
the sector-specificity of facilities, supporting infrastructure, and workforce skills. The 
first two variables tend to be inversely related to the last two variables.  
 
These variables are interrelated and consequently it is possible to group them 
together in order to describe particular sectoral ‘syndromes’ that broadly result in 
distinctive institutional structures and capabilities, external and internal distributions 
of power, and sets of societal actors. It is possible to imagine a single continuum 
between two ideal types: ‘concentrated’ sectors characterized by high levels of 
capital intensity, high economies of scale, low production flexibility and low factor 
flexibility; and ‘dispersed’ sectors marked by low levels of capital intensity, low 
economies of scale, high production flexibility and high factor flexibility. This 
dichotomy is a simplification of reality made for heuristic purposes; it does not 
describe all types of sectors that might be observed. For instance, some sectors may 
display high levels of capital intensity and high economies of scale alongside high 
production flexibility and asset flexibility. The presence of high asset and production 
flexibility along high capital intensity might be a function of high levels of 
technological development within a firm or sector. In which case, the flexibility 
afforded by high technology capital may make a firm or sector less resistant to 
change. In short, however, different mixes of concentrated and dispersed sectors will   21
be expected to influence the development of distinct patterns of competition within a 
society.  
 
Concentrated and dispersed sectors exhibit different market structures and 
impose different behavioural opportunities and constraints upon organizations 
located within them.
13 Concentrated sectors are typified by monopolistic or 
oligopolistic market structures with high barriers to entry and exit. Conversely, 
dispersed sectors are characterised by larger numbers of relatively small, competitive 
firms. Barriers to entry and exit are lower due to the absence of high levels of 
economies of scale and low levels of capital intensity. These different conditions give 
rise to different political strategies that are employed by firms in their respective 
sectors. Firms within ‘concentrated’ sectors tend to be fewer in number and larger in 
size and employ stabilizing strategies to manage the risks to their large investments. 
Of these strategies, collusion - either with fellow oligopolists and with or through the 
state – is seen as a rational means to providing stability to their respective markets. 
This makes change in concentrated sectors more difficult because large firms 
responsible for export earnings and for the provision of employment are able to 
mobilize resources (lobbying, strikes, etc) to insulate them from the pressures of 
competition, thus making firms from concentrated sectors potent political actors that 
might be more likely to be resistant to change. Conversely, dispersed forms of 
productive organization lower barriers to entry and exit, thus creating larger numbers 
of firms; this in turn encourages competition, making it more difficult to coordinate 
collective responses to changes in the market. Thus, the level of competition or rent-
seeking within an economy can be seen as a direct consequence of a country’s 
sectoral profile.
14   
 
                                                 
13 The following section is informed by the ‘collective action’ literature, especially the work of Mancur Olson. 
See: The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard University Press, 1965); The Rise and Decline of Nations (Yale 
University Press, 1982); and Power and Prosperity (Basic Books, 2003). 
14 The international dimension also explains some of the pressures that are imposed on domestic firms and the 
broad range of strategies employed to cope with these pressures. Domestically, firms’ interests are also shaped 
by the international sector that they are located within. For example, concentrated sectors will oppose attempts at 
economic restructuring within their respective state, if they perceive that their sector will become less important. 
This is because such sectors (and to a certain extent, the state) have a range of ‘sunken costs’ in their given 
industry (capital – fixed and human, investment in infrastructure, etc.) that restrict their flexibility to adapt to a 
changing environment. Collectively, these international pressures and domestic pressures form collective action 
opportunity structures that “provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their 
expectations for success or failure” (Tarrow, 1994, p.85).    22
3.4. The technology intensity of production and the implications for economic and 
political competition.  
 
The level of technological development within and across different sectors is 
broadly related to the factors described above.
15 Specifically, it affects the flexibility 
and organizational complexity of a sector which in turn has important consequences 
for the level of competition within a given sector and also for the manner in which the 
incentive to pressure the state is shaped by its flexibility. Higher technological levels 
of development tend to increase the organizational complexity and production 
flexibility of sectors with three main effects: (i) sectors are less likely to be affected by 
the sort of sudden fluctuations in prices associated with primary products; (ii) they are 
more likely to possess more flexible production systems, enabling quicker changes in 
product mix in response to market changes, and reducing the incentive to attempt to 
alter state policy; and (iii) higher technology sectors are more likely to be information 
intensive, rather than simply just capital intensive, and more likely to be organised 
‘horizontally’ than is the case in ‘vertically’ organised sectors that rely on economies 
of scale.  
 
Conversely,  countries that possess export profiles that are concentrated in 
exporting primary products or other goods requiring a relatively low level of 
technological development will, in general, be likely to: (i) be prone to crises imposed 
by fluctuations in world prices for commodities; (ii) be characterised by high levels of 
asset specificity, i.e. possessing dedicated plant and equipment producing stable 
product mixes, thereby increasing the incentive for firms to pressure the state into 
protecting their sectors from world market conditions; and (iii) possess sectors 
characterised by high levels of capital intensity and economies of scale, thus 
reducing the number of firms, but increasing their size. In these instances, collective 
action problems for firms within concentrated sectors are reduced and the incentive 
to influence state policy is higher.  
 
                                                 
15 The technological level of development across an economy is a function of both exogenous and endogenous 
factors. It is exogenous when interaction with the world economy transmits technology across state boundries as 
firms adopt technology and practices from other firms. Endogenous development occurs when domestic 
organizations increase their level of technological development in response to competitive pressures, relative 
price changes, improvements in property rights provision or through the allocation of increased resources to 
technological development.   23
High levels of market concentration within and across sectors increase the 
likelihood of a concentration of economic resources, thereby reducing the probability 
of the development of any robust political competition that fuels the creation of open-
access orders. Consequently, economies dominated by a small number of sectors 
that are themselves monopolies or oligopolies, are more likely to experience high 
levels of rent-seeking behaviour and also closer links between state and economy. 
Such close links between state and economy cause the lines between public and 
private property to be blurred, resulting in: (i) higher levels of corruption; and (ii) a 
tendency towards either state predation over dominant export sectors; or predation of 
dominant export sectors over the state. In both instances, the end result is largely the 
same; a fusion of public and private resources and the control of economic resources 
by a relatively small number of actors, the hall mark of a limited-access order.  
 
The differences between ‘older’ techno-economic production structures and 
newer ones are summarised in Table 1. This general tendency towards diffusion of 
information and economic power in higher technology sectors reduces the 
concentration of market share in companies and facilitates competition, thereby 
reducing the incentive and capacity for exerting pressure over the state. A state’s role 
in such sectors is one of information coordination and selective regulation, with a very 
low incentive for state ownership and interference due to the myriad problems 
associated with centralised, bureaucratic control of information and allocation of 
resources that increases with technological complexity (von Hayek, 1945). 
Consequently, close direct links between state and economy should be lower, given 
the limited opportunities presented by the diffusion of production and information, and 
the opportunities for predation, by either state or industry, are severely curtailed by 
competition. 
 
Table 1. Two techno-economic paradigms 
Fordist production techniques (old)  IT  led production techniques (new) 
Energy intensive  Information intensive 
Standardized Customized 
Rather stable product mix  Rapid changes in product mix 
Dedicated plant and equipment  Flexible production systems 
Automation Systemization   24
Single firm  Networks 
Hierarchical structures  Flat horizontal structures 
Departmental Integrated 
Product with service  Service with products 
Centralization Distributed  intelligence 
Specialized skills  Multiskilling 
Government ownership, control, and 
planning 
Government information coordination 
and regulation; vision 
Source:  Adapted from Freeman, C. (1992), The Economics of Hope, London: Pinter 
Publishers 
 
3.5. The mechanisms linking economic structure and political competition 
 
In the context of a sectoral approach to institutional analysis, the incentives for 
organizations to undertake collective action are framed by their sectoral interests, 
which in turn are shaped by the market structure and market signals at both the 
international and domestic level, with sectors’ expectations for success or failure 
largely determined by the size and resources at the disposal of economic 
organizations. However, the mechanisms linking export sectors to political 
competition should be expected to vary across cases, depending on the level of 
competition prevalent within each economy. For example, mechanisms might be 
expected to include the representation of business interests directly in parliamentary 
parties (where parliaments have power), or indirectly through dialogue between 
political parties or the government and non-party economic organizations such as 
business associations, trade unions, etc. In such instances, greater competition 
within the economic arena would manifest itself in more or less open, transparent and 
rule-based competition within business associations, political parties, etc.  
 
More limited economic competition, however, is likely to manifest itself in lower 
levels of competition within those mechanisms that might be targeted by economic 
organizations In such circumstances, political parties, business associations, trade 
unions, etc., might be dominated by a single or a very few economic interests. This 
might result in informal mechanisms, such as personal links between economic 
actors and political actors, becoming prevalent. In short, while the mechanisms   25
through which economic and political competition are channeled may vary, it is the 
degree of competition within the economy that will be expected to be of most 
importance in shaping whether that competition is channeled onto the political level in 
an open and rule-based manner or not.   
 
4. Measuring the variables 
 
4.1. Measuring the dependent variable: social orders   
The outline of the core distinguishing characteristics of social orders presented 
indicates that any attempt to operationalize the dependent variable should focus on 
two key areas. First, it is essential to capture the extent to which impersonal, rule-
based behaviour is prevalent within a society. Second, and this is not unrelated to the 
first point, the openness of politics within a society should be measured. Open-
access orders would be characterized by the dominance of impersonal, universally 
enforced legal frameworks in which competition between organizations (economic, 
political and otherwise) is conducted in a more open manner. By contrast, closed-
access orders would be defined by the selective application of rules, both at the elite 
level and within wider society, and by the channeling of competitive tendencies 
through informal ties and relationships. Clearly, this dichotomy covers a number of 
different phenomena including corruption, the nature of political competition (open or 
closed), and broader issues of the rule of law.  
Naturally, any attempt to measure these phenomena is fraught with some 
difficulty. For example, assessing the extent to which a society, on aggregate, 
conforms to formal laws and regulations, is tainted by corruption, or is characterized 
by an open and transparent manner of channeling competition all involve referring to 
subjective judgments about which criteria to include, how to weigh criteria, how to 
observe these phenomena and who is best placed to observe them, and so on. 
However, this does not mean that analysts should avoid trying to measure these 
phenomena; merely that they should remain cognizant of the potential pitfalls that 
surround any attempt to do so. With this qualification in mind, the measurement of 
social orders employed throughout this study is a composite index utilizing three of 
the six ‘Governance Indicators’ (WBGI) constructed by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, 
and Massimo Mastruzzi (2007).  They are:   26
 
(1)  Voice and Accountability (VA) – this measures the extent to which a 
country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well 
as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Of the 
two components of social-order type discussed above, this indicator measures 
the openness of competition within a society;  
 
(2)  Rule of Law (RL) – this captures the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence; 
 
(3) Control of Corruption (CC) – this indicates the extent to which public power 
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
Indicators 2 and 3 measure the extent to which impersonal, rule-based 
behaviour is prevalent within a society. 
 
Scores range between – 2.5 (the lowest level on each indicator) to +2.5 (the 
highest level on each indicator). The composite score is a simple un-weighted 
average of the three component indicators. The scores are based on extensive, 
multiple surveys and are available bi-annually for all major countries from 1996 to 
2002, and annually from 2003 until 2007. The components for the three scores are 
composite perceptions-based indicators and are drawn from 33 data sources 
provided by 25 different organizations, including assessments by non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), multilateral development agencies (e.g., European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, World Bank, etc.), other public sector data 
providers, and commercial business information providers (e.g. Economist 
Intelligence Unit, Global Insight, Political Risk Services, etc.). A comprehensive 
description of the data and the methodology used in its compilation is contained in 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007).
16 The individual coefficients, as well as the 
composite scores, are described in Table 3.1. The two time periods – 1998 and 2006 
– are chosen (i) because they approximate the earliest and latest points for which 
                                                 
16 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi also provide standard error terms for each of the indicators in each given 
year.    27
complete datasets for all three indicators were collected; and (ii) because they are 
temporally consistent with the data collected to measure the independent variable 
(see below).  
 
A number of weaknesses with the WBGI have been alleged (Arndt and Oman, 
2006) and include: (i) the likelihood of correlation of errors among the sources from 
which the composite indicators are constructed, which significantly limits the 
statistical legitimacy of using them to compare countries’ scores; (ii) their lack of 
comparability over time; and (iii) sample bias.
17 The authors of these indicators have 
addressed these criticisms and have accepted that their attempts at measurement 
are not perfect (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2007; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2007). 
However, their response suggests that while there is room for improvement, the 




Table 2. Variation in type of social order across post-communist region, 1998 and 
2007 
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1.26  -0.49   
                                                 
17 The same study also highlights the strong and positive correlation between the governance indicators and 
measures of per capital national income. Indeed, the correlation between the dependent variable and per capita 
GDP (PPP) is strong (r =.83) among the cases under observation in this study. However, it is difficult to 
ascertain the direction of causality in the relationship between the two variables. Consequently, although it might 
be argued that high levels of economic development help cause higher scores on the dependent variable, it might 
also be argued with as much justification that higher scores on the dependent variable in this study (social order) 
is an important factor in facilitating economic development.   
18 In fairness to Arndt and Oman, after assessing the strengths and weaknesses of World Bank Governance 
Indicators they do refer to them as “probably the most carefully constructed governance indicators”.    28
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   Latvia  0.81  0.86  0.18  0.57  0.10  0.31  0.36  0.58  0.22   
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0.03  0.28  0.30  0.54  0.24   
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   Ukraine  -0.32  -0.09 
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0.08  -0.01   
                                  
Source: Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2008), World Bank Governance 
Indicators, World Bank: Washington D.C; and author’s calculations 
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In relation to the first criticism, the authors argue that the presence of 
correlated errors among sources does not eliminate the benefit of constructing an 
aggregate governance indicator, although it does reduce it. However, as long as the 
errors among data sources are not perfectly correlated, the gains from the 
aggregation of data make the WBGI superior to using any single source.   
 
 The criticism of a lack of comparability over time is made on two points. The 
first refers to the fact that the world average governance indicators are scaled to have 
a zero mean and unit standard deviation in each period. However, this only applies to 
the world average and does not affect individual country scores. The second criticism 
is that the presence of margins of error in the indicators obviates the ability to make 
comparisons over time. However, the authors argue that it is precisely the presence 
margins of error that enhances the WBGIs as they provide guidance as to which 
observed changes are likely to be meaningful.  
 
     Finally,  the  third  criticism  accuses the authors of sample bias in their 
underlying data sources. Specifically, they are accused of an overdependence on the 
views of business elites, particularly foreign investors. These accusations are quite 
weak. First, the range of data sources is considerably broader than just the 
perceptions of businesses and includes the views of a range of other sources, 
including governments and multilateral organizations. Second, where data sources 
do consult firms, there are a wide range of respondents, including domestic and 
foreign firms, as well as firms of different sizes. 
 
 
4.2. Measuring the structure of export sectors
19 
 
Four measures, three quantitative and one qualitative, are employed to 
measure the structure of export profiles across the post-communist region. First, the 
degree to which export profiles are concentrated or dispersed will be measured using 
the Krugman Specialization Index (KSI), which identifies the overall concentration or 
diversity of a country’s export profile. Second, an index of Revealed Comparative 
Advantage (RCA) is used to highlight the sectors that occupy a relatively important 
                                                 
19 This section and the data on export structures are based on Richard Connolly, ‘The Structure of Russian 
Industrial Exports in Comparative Perspective’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol.49, No.5 (2008).    30
role within a country’s export profile. Third, each of the 260 export activities are 
classified according to the level of technology intensity required in their production. 
Using these data, a Technological Development and Diversity Index (TDDI) is 
constructed to simultaneously measure the overall level of production 
diversity/concentration and technological development within a country’s export 
profile. Finally, more detailed case-studies are used to gauge the level of intra-
sectoral competition in a country’s leading export sectors. 
 
The data are taken from the Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN 
Comtrade, 2008) from the United Nations Statistics Division, and there are some 
limitations. For example, the reporting of some goods is sometimes incomplete, and 
certain sensitive goods (such as some precious stones or armaments) can be hidden 
or included in different commodity groups. A note of caution also applies to any 
analysis that considers different countries at different periods of time due to the 
probability of fluctuations in exchange rates and in the relative prices of different 
products.  
 
4.2.1. Inter-sectoral concentration or diversity 
 
The Krugman Specialization Index. The Krugman Specialization Index (KSI) 
is a relative measure of sectoral specialization (Krugman, 1991), indicating whether a 
country possesses a concentrated or diverse inter-sectoral export profile. For each 
country, the share of sector i in that country’s total exports is calculated, followed by 
the world average share of sector i  in total world exports. The index is the sum of the 
absolute difference of the sectoral structures of the two areas j (the country under 
observation) and w (the world average). Thus, Kjw = ∑i │S 
s
ij -- S 
s
iw│. The index is 
zero if the two areas have the same export structures, whereas its maximum value is 
2.0, reached if the two areas do not have any commonality in export structures. It 
should be noted that the KSI tends to under represent the degree of specialization of 
larger countries. One-digit positions of the Standard International Trade 
Classification, Revision 3 (SITC, Rev. 3) are used for 1997 and 2006, the first year 
for which data are available for all countries under examination and the most recent 
year. The KSI coefficients for both years are presented below (Fig. 1)  
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Figure 1. Krugman Specialization Index, 1997 and 2006
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Source: UN Comtrade Database (2008); and author’s calculations.  
 
 
The Balassa Index of Revealed Comparative Advantage. The Balassa 
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) index is the ratio of the share of a product 
group i for country j and the share of the exports of the product group i in the total 
export for a group of countries (Balassa, 1965). The RCA index thus indicates 
whether country j has a comparative advantage with respect to a certain product i. 
                                                 
20 Countries are sorted in descending order by their KSI scores in 2006.   32
The index for country j, product i, is RCAji = 100 (Xji/Xwi)/(Xjt/Xwt), where Xab is exports 
by country a (w = world) of product b (t = total for all products). Values higher than 
1.0 indicate a comparative advantage in that product which, in the context of this 
study, indicates that it is a relatively important sector within a country’s economy. 
RCA is calculated at the more detailed three-digit position of the SITC, Rev. 3 
classification in 1997 and 2006.  
 
4.2.2. The technology intensity of exports 
 
In order to capture the technological intensity of sectors in which countries are 
competitive, the 260 activities described at the three-digit level are grouped according 
to the level of technological sophistication involved in their production. There are a 
number of ways in which activities can be categorized by technology. A commonly 
used method (based on Pavitt, 1984) is to distinguish between resource-based, 
labor-intensive, scale-intensive, as well as differentiated and science-based 
manufactures. This can be difficult because the analytical distinctions are unclear, 
and there are large overlaps between categories. The OECD (1994) suggests a more 
detailed classification based on technological activity within each category. Lall 
(2000) has combined elements of both methods, grouping the three-digit data into 
five broad categories (primary products, resource-based, low-technology, medium-
technology, and high-technology) containing nine subcategories within them. The 
classification employed here draws heavily on Lall’s classification, with some 
modifications. Export activities are grouped under four categories: primary and 
resource-based; low-technology; medium-technology; and high-technology. Two 
further subcategories from within the high-technology group are identified and three 
from within the medium-technology group. The proportion of medium- and high-
technology exports is used as an indicator of a country’s overall technological 
development. A description of trends in changes in the structure of export profiles 
across the region is contained in the next chapter.   
 
Primary and Resource-Based Products (PRBP). This category includes two 
types of activity—extractive activities and those that involve the simple processing of 
primary products extracted from the territory of a given country, including livestock,   33
metals, oil, and gas. In technological terms, the simple processing of these products 
does not generally involve much technological addition to the product itself.
21  
 
Low-Technology Products (LT). These products  tend to require stable, well-
diffused technologies. Any technology that is used is primarily embodied in capital 
equipment, requiring simple labor skills to operate. Such products (e.g., textiles) are, 
in general, undifferentiated, with price being the main determinant of 
competitiveness. Given the relatively low capital intensity, scale economies and 
barriers to entry are generally low.
22 
 
Medium-Technology Products (MT). These products, comprising the core of 
skill- and scale-intensive technologies in capital goods and intermediate products, 
constitute the largest proportion of export manufacturing activity in middle- to high-
income economies. These activities tend to utilize relatively complex technologies, 
with moderately high levels of research and development, advanced skill-set 
requirements, and lengthy learning periods; they thus rely upon a higher level of 
human capital. These activities are split into three subgroups. Activities within the 
automotive and engineering subgroups (MT1 and MT3) are very linkage intensive, 
require significant inter-firm interaction, and emphasize product design and 
development. Many have mass assembly or production plants and extensive supplier 
networks, both domestic and foreign.
23 Barriers to entry tend to be high because of 
the high economies of scale and moderate to high capital intensity. Subgroup MT2 
comprises industries that produce chemicals and process basic metals. Such 
process sectors tend to produce stable and undifferentiated goods; they too are often 
characterized by high economies of scale, and possess relatively high levels of 
technological sophistication, particularly in the production of high value-added steel 
products, chemicals, and plastics.   
 
High-Technology Products (HT). High-technology activities utilize advanced 
and dynamic technologies, with substantial investments in research and development 
                                                 
21However, some products, such as oil and gas, may require advanced technology to perform the process of 
extraction itself. This type of machinery, however, is assigned to other categories.  
22Some low-technology products can be found in high-quality industries in which brand names, skills, design, 
and technological sophistication are very important, even if technology intensity does not reach the levels of 
other categories. Examples might include high-end, designer fashion products for which the brand name is 
important. 
23Small and medium-sized enterprises often are important in these sectors.    34
and a considerable emphasis on product design. The most advanced technologies 
require sophisticated technological infrastructure, high levels of specialized technical 
skills, and close interaction among firms, and also between firms and universities or 
other research institutions. Here, high-technology activities are split into two sub-
groups.  
 
The first (HT1) comprises activities that can be described as light industrial 
products. These include the manufacture of electronic equipment such as computers, 
computer components, audio-visual equipment, and office equipment. Many such 
products are labor intensive at the final assembly stage, and their high value-to-
weight ratios make it economical to locate this stage of production in low-wage areas. 
The role of multinational corporations (MNCs) and integrated international production 
networks (IPNs) are of crucial importance, as the different stages of production can 
be distributed across countries to capitalize on labor cost differences. In this respect, 
the extent to which these activities reflect the development of indigenous 
technological capacities can vary, as in some cases a country may only be involved 
in the final, labor-intensive assembly stage and not in the higher value-added earlier 
stages (such as R&D, or earlier, high-tech production of components for assembly).  
 
The second sub-group (HT2) comprises other high-technology activities that 
are more likely to involve the domestic production of the higher value-added 
components, with greater emphasis on domestic human capital, technological 
research and development, and denser local supply networks. This group includes 
products such as pharmaceuticals, power generation equipment, aircraft, optical and 
other precision instruments, and measurement equipment.        
 
There are limitations associated with this method of categorization. Given the 
nature of the export data, it is not possible to capture every aspect of technological 
change from national statistics. Activities involving different levels of technological 
complexity may be grouped together within the same product category.
24 
Furthermore, it is not possible to gauge quality differences within product groups. It is 
thus difficult to distinguish between a low-technology, low-reliability personal 
computer and a top-end, machine designed for specialists. As mentioned above, it is 
                                                 
24For example, office machines may encompass a range of technologies ranging from simple personal computers 
to more advanced, specialized equipment.    35
difficult to identify the processes involved in manufacturing the same product across 
different locations. In the electronics sector, for example, high-end processes such as 
micro-fabrication or software development may take place in Japan, Germany, or the 
United States and the final assembly stage may take place in China or Hungary. 
However, the data treat the two processes as technologically equivalent. It is also 
difficult to determine whether technological upgrading has taken place within product 
groups over time. Thus, smaller N studies are desirable to draw out more subtle, 
intra-sectoral changes within economies. Notwithstanding these limitations, the data 
do display a considerable level of product differentiation and can provide useful 
insights into broad patterns of technological development across countries.  
 
4.3.3. The Technological Development and Diversity Index  
 
The discussion so far suggests that, at least theoretically, a relationship exists 
between the diversity of production and higher levels of technological development. 
Figure 2 confirms that there is a considerable correlation (Pearson’s r = .82) within 
the sample chosen for this study between a country’s score on the Krugman 
Specialization Index and the proportions of medium- and high-technology products 
within a country’s export profile.  It is possible to observe three distinct groups. The 
first, Group A, comprises Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia. They all possess export profiles that are diverse and score highly in terms 
of their proportion of medium- and high-technology products.
25 Group B consists of 
those countries that, while not overly specialized in terms of their export profiles, 
score moderately in terms of their total medium- and high-technology products as a 
proportion of their total exports. This group includes Bulgaria, Belarus, Georgia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Ukraine. Finally, Group C contains Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Russia. All have concentrated 
export profiles and tend to export comparatively low levels of medium- and high-
technology products.  
 
                                                 
25 Within this group it is interesting to note that this sector is composed of sub-sectors that should display a 
diverse mix of inputs and might be expected to display varying levels of capital intensity, economies of scale, 
asset/factor flexibility and production flexibility. For example, whilst the production of motor vehicles might be 
seen as an industry that would be dominated by few firms, the outsourcing of the production of components used 
within the production process is likely to be spread across a large number of smaller firms.   36






















 Source: UN Comtrade Database (2008); author’s own calculations. 
 
This observed association between the two variables allows the construction of a 
separate variable that captures both the KSI and the proportion of medium- and high-
technology scores into a single coefficient, the Technological Development and 
Diversity Index. This index is the sum of the reversed KSI score and the proportion of 
medium- and high-technology exports. Both variables are given equal weighting by 
dividing the numerator by two. If K = Krugman Specialization Index, T = Medium- and 
High-Technology Exports, and TDDI = Technological Development and Diversity 
Index, this can be expressed as TDDI = {(1-K)+(T)}/2. The index is zero if a country’s 
export profile is concentrated in one resource-based or low-technology activity. A 
maximum value of 1.0 is reached if a country has an extremely diverse export profile 
and all of its exports are either medium- or high-technology products. The scores for 
each country within the region are listed in Table 3.  
 
 
    
 
 
                                                 
26 This chart describes the association between the two variables in 2006. In 1997 - the other year for which 
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Group A   37
Table 3. Technology and Diversity Index, 1997 and 2006 
                 
   Country  1997  2006 
Change  
(1997-2006)    
                 
   Armenia  0.36  0.31  -0.05    
   Azerbaijan  0.20  0.16  -0.04    
   Belarus  0.66  0.51  -0.16    
   Bulgaria  0.48  0.45  -0.02    
   Czech Rep.  0.69  0.71  0.02    
   Estonia  0.57  0.61  0.05    
   Georgia  0.43  0.50  0.08    
   Hungary  0.68  0.73  0.05    
   Kazakhstan  0.28  0.22  -0.06    
   Kyrgyzstan  0.33  0.34  0.02    
   Latvia  0.40  0.45  0.06    
   Lithuania  0.54  0.54  0.00    
   Moldova  0.32  0.27  -0.05    
   Poland  0.54  0.67  0.13    
   Romania  0.46  0.58  0.12    
   Russia  0.27  0.27  0.00    
   Slovakia  0.60  0.69  0.09    
   Slovenia  0.64  0.67  0.03    
   Ukraine  0.48  0.50  0.02    
                 
   Average  0.47  0.48  0.01    
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4. Conclusion 
 
  This paper has outlined a framework for understanding the development of 
different social orders across the post-communist Europe. First, the theoretical 
relationship between economic order and political order type was laid out. Second, 
economic structure was suggested to be an important explanatory variable. Third, the 
variables were operationalized and shown to display a correlation. This paper 
represents a preliminary exploration of the relationship between the two variables 
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